

Approved For Release 2007/03/08

CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6

219

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

TO: NAME AND ADDRESS		DATE	INITIALS
1			
2			
3			
4			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
REMARKS:			
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.		DATE	

CONTROL NO.

25X1



25X1

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY CABLE

Tuesday July 26, 1977

CG NIDC 77-172C

25X1

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

State Dept. review completed

Top Secret

(Security Classification)

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6

National Intelligence Daily Cable for Tuesday, July 26, 1977

[REDACTED] The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

CONTENTS

EGYPT-LIBYA: Situation Report	Page 1	
		25X1
FRANCE: Campaign Against Left	Page 5	
		25X1
USSR: Internal Politics	Page 7	
ANGOLA - SOUTH AFRICA: [REDACTED]	Page 9	25X1
PAKISTAN: Army Discontent	Page 10	
ALBANIA-CHINA: Reducing Ties?	Page 11	
BRIEFS:	Page 12	
Zambia-China Romania		

[Redacted]

EGYPT-LIBYA: Situation Report

25X1

[Redacted] There were no clashes along the Egyptian-Libyan border yesterday following President Sadat's unilateral order for a cease-fire on Sunday. Although the Libyans almost certainly welcome the reprieve, they have not yet responded to Sadat's announcement and continue to churn out bellicose propaganda against the Egyptians. Arab mediators continue to shuttle between the two countries but have not yet arranged a formal truce.

25X1

[Redacted] The defiant tone of the Libyan media--although probably intended primarily to rally the Libyan public--suggests that President Qadhafi may not want a formal truce as long as the de facto cease-fire holds up. This would give him time to assess his military losses, seek outside help, and play up Egyptian "aggression."

25X1

[Redacted] It is also possible that Qadhafi wants to keep alive the possibility of a resumption of hostilities until Secretary Vance's visit to the region in early August. Qadhafi may reason that this would at the very least cause some embarrassment for the Egyptians and thus make the visit more difficult.

25X1

[Redacted] The Libyan press has become increasingly explicit in its allegations that the US has collaborated in Egyptian aggression. The media have accused the US of trying to punish Libya for opposing US policy and of collaborating with Israel in using Sadat against a fellow Arab.

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6

25X1

[redacted] In addition to Algerian, Kuwaiti, and Palestinian mediation efforts, several Arab and African states have called for emergency meetings of the Arab League and the Organization of African Unity. The general Arab attitude reflected in the media throughout the region continues to be one of disappointment and concern over yet another split in Arab ranks.

25X1

[redacted] Arab countries have admonished both Egypt and Libya for diverting resources and attention from the primary struggle with Israel. Cairo has been criticized in several instances even by some Arab moderates for exercising its clear military superiority and failing to show more patience and restraint.

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6

25X1


Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6

25X1



FRANCE: Campaign Against Left

25X1

The French government, concerned about the threat posed by the Communist-Socialist alliance in the legislative election next March, has pulled out all stops in its publicity and propaganda campaign against the left. President Giscard apparently is counting heavily on the campaign to regain ground lost to the left over the past several years.

25X1

The government is scrutinizing the left's common program and denouncing its "dangers" and "contradictions." It is developing a plan to present a detailed critical analysis of the program to French voters by autumn. Using modern marketing techniques, the campaign is emphasizing the benefits various social groups have attained under the Giscard government.

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6

25X1

[redacted] A young marketing and communication expert attached to the Elysee is masterminding part of the operation. He has a team of about a hundred associates stationed throughout France. Another group, attached to Prime Minister Barre's office, has been responsible for unattributed television commercials publicizing the Prime Minister's economic plan. These commercials apparently are having some effect; some 30 percent of the viewers reportedly have memorized some of the jingles.

25X1

[redacted] Another organization is functioning as a sort of study group for government ministries. It is now working on a project to inform motorists of the virtues of the Barre plan at every toll stop on major highways.

25X1

[redacted] The government is also assisting in the formation of minuscule political groups designed to attract center-left voters who do not want to vote for the governing coalition but are fearful of the consequences of a victory by the left. The Patronat, an organization of French businessmen, is actively waging its own anti-left campaign.

25X1


[redacted] The governing coalition has seen its share of the vote slip from 53 to 46 percent in the 220 largest cities in six years. The President's image has been damaged since his election in 1974, and the quarrels within his coalition have further disenchanted the voters. His election team faces an uphill task. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6

25X1



USSR: Internal Politics

25X1

[Redacted] Political maneuvering among Soviet leaders on the proposed new constitution is continuing. One of the important points at issue is whether Leonid Brezhnev's current double-hatting as both party boss and President is a temporary arrangement or is to be institutionalized.

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6

25X1

[redacted] A Central Committee plenum resolution in May apparently touched on the problem, but the resolution has not been published. The draft constitution published in early June does not address the question, although it could be amended on this point before its adoption, scheduled for October.

25X1

[redacted] Senior party theoretician Suslov, in a speech to the Supreme Soviet in mid-June nominating Brezhnev for the presidency, described the plenum resolution as applying to Brezhnev personally. His version of the resolution's phrasing left the way open to restricting Brezhnev at some later date to the honorary presidency alone. The day after Suslov's speech, Brezhnev strongly implied that the two posts would henceforth be permanently combined--a form of protection to Brezhnev himself as well as a boon to whoever aspires to succeed him as party boss.

25X1

[redacted] The question is clearly a sensitive one. In reporting the Supreme Soviet session, *Izvestia*, in a rare display of insecurity, carefully quoted by name first Suslov and then Brezhnev. The next day, *Pravda*, in referring to the plenum resolution, chose to use only the Brezhnev formulation, but without attribution.

25X1

[redacted] The most recent public evidence of partisan activity on this issue was contained in a speech last week by Politburo candidate-member Mikhail Solomentsev, who is premier of the Russian Republic. His speech to the Russian Supreme Soviet was lavish in its praise of Brezhnev and of the benefits to be derived from his holding both posts. Like Suslov, however, Solomentsev described the plenum resolution as cast in personal, not institutional, terms.

25X1

[redacted] Solomentsev has been a candidate-member of the Politburo since 1971 and is long overdue for promotion to full member. At 63, he belongs to the "generation in waiting." He has kept a low profile in recent years and his public stand on this issue suggests that it is by no means decided. More political maneuvering can be expected between now and the adoption of the constitution in October.

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6

ANGOLA - SOUTH AFRICA: [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] The Angolans have publicly accused South African troops of shooting down an Angolan transport plane near Cuangar last week and later occupying the town. The South Africans deny the charges; National Union guerrillas almost certainly were responsible for both actions.

25X1

[redacted] According to South African press reports, at least 200 people were killed in the fighting around Cuangar and hundreds--including Angolan government troops--fled across the border into Namibia. [redacted]

25X1
25X1

25X1

[redacted] Power lines near the Cunene dam have been cut several times this month; the South Africans are seeking permission to enter Angola to repair the damage. South Africa blames the South-West Africa People's Organization for the damage, but SWAPO has denied the allegations, explaining that its forces are under strict orders to conduct no military operations in Angola.

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6

PAKISTAN: Army Discontent

25X1

[redacted] Differences among senior Pakistani army officers are growing, but have not yet become serious enough to threaten plans to transfer power to civilians in October. Those who disagree with the policies of Chief Martial Law Administrator Zia-ul-Haq do not seem to be well organized and are not now prepared for a showdown over the military's political role.

25X1

[redacted] Lieutenant General Iqbal, one of the most influential corps commanders, has reportedly told Zia that the army should take a more active role against inefficiency and corruption, that elections should be postponed, and that former prime minister Bhutto should be barred from participating. There is some evidence that an "Iqbal faction" has sprung up among lieutenant colonels and majors, and that he may have the backing of one other corps commander.

25X1

[redacted] Zia has not changed his public position that elections, open to any candidate, will be held in October. The military government has imposed tougher controls on political activity, however, and may be planning to prosecute some senior officials of the Bhutto government. There have been several recent disclosures implicating Bhutto in illegal activities, and the US embassy believes a major probe could be in the offing.

25X1

[redacted] A decision to replace two key staff officers is a further indication of problems among the generals. The army's senior staff officer--who is close to Iqbal--was transferred, presumably in part because of differences with Zia. He disapproved of Zia's allowing Bhutto to use the army for political purposes before the coup and may also be unhappy with some of Zia's more recent actions, such as reviving amputation as a criminal penalty.

25X1

[redacted] The director of military intelligence is being forced to retire, possibly because his fellow generals now regard him as a liability. He used military intelligence resources to support and carry out political actions against Bhutto's opponents.

25X1

ALBANIA-CHINA: Reducing Ties?

25X1 [REDACTED] The Albanian regime has asked China to withdraw its technicians from the country, according to press reports from Belgrade. It is not clear whether the reported request was for withdrawal of the technicians immediately or after completion of Chinese projects now under way. Press sources in Belgrade estimate that there are between 700 and 2,000 Chinese technicians working in Albania.

25X1 [REDACTED] We cannot confirm these reports, and the Albanian embassy in Belgrade has denied them. Such a step would, however, be in keeping with recent Albanian behavior. Earlier this month, Albania reportedly withdrew its cadets training with the Chinese air force and has decided not to send new students to study at Peking University next year. Albania's efforts to reduce its reliance on China follow its decision to publish an editorial on July 7 detailing political and ideological differences between the two regimes.

25X1 [REDACTED] //The Chinese still appear determined to play down the differences. The Chinese media have defended the rationale of China's foreign policies, but without directly referring to the Albanian charges. [REDACTED]

25X1
25X1

25X1 [REDACTED] //Until recently, Chinese economic and military assistance continued to arrive in Albania, although on a reduced scale. It has apparently been some years since a new project has been started, but Chinese technicians are still at work on projects contracted for the early 1970s.//

25X1 [REDACTED] Recent Albanian approaches to a number of West European countries, particularly France and Greece, suggest that some members of the leadership may be thinking of improving economic ties with Western Europe. It is doubtful, however, that such initiatives could fill the gap that would be created by the loss of Chinese assistance. [REDACTED]

25X1

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6

BRIEFS

Zambia-China:

25X1 [redacted] The Zambian government recently accredited a military attache from China--an abrupt break with past policy that did not allow for such accreditations. Zambian officials have justified the move on the grounds that a Zambian military attache is accredited to Peking. The arrival of the Chinese attache fits in with previous reporting that Zambian officers recently visited Peking with an eye toward purchasing arms and possibly MIG-19s. [redacted]

Romania:

25X1 [redacted] Since the Carter administration took office, Romania has repeatedly said that it wants to maintain its "special relationship" with the US. Bucharest became upset, however, by unfavorable Western press reports on human rights in Romania. In March it launched a stridently anti-Western and pointedly anti-US media campaign--unknown in Romania for some years.

25X1 [redacted] By June, the volume and intensity of the campaign had diminished considerably, and the Romanian media resumed carrying favorable articles on the US. In addition, the US ambassador was permitted to broadcast a message on Romanian television that referred unambiguously to President Carter's stance on human rights. [redacted]

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6

Top Secret

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6

(Security Classification)

Top Secret

Approved For Release 2007/03/08 : CIA-RDP79T00975A030200010090-6
(Security Classification)